Towards a fully automated Blue Team at Locked Shields

Dr. Roland Meier

armasuisse

Switzerland



The history

2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict

Silent Battle T. Minárik, S.Alatalu, S.Biondi, M.Signoretti, I.Tolga, G.Visky (Eds.) 2019 © NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn

Machine Learning-based Detection of C&C Channels with a Focus on the Locked Shields Cyber Defense Exercise

Nicolas Känzig

Department of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering ETH Zürich

Zürich, Switzerland kaenzign@student.ethz.ch

Luca Gambazz Science and Technology

armasuisse Thun, Switzerland

luca.gambazzi@armasuisse.ch

Laurent Vanbever Department of Information Technology

and Electrical Engineering ETH Zürich Zürich, Switzerland lvanbever@ethz.ch

Abstract: The diversity of applications and devices in enterprise netwo with large traffic volumes make it inherently challenging to quickly iden traffic. When incidents occur, emergency response teams often lose pr reverse-engineering the network topology and configuration before the malicious activities and digital forensics.

Roland Meier

Department of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering ETH Zürich

Zürich Switzerland meierrol@ethz.ch

Vincent Lenders Science and Technology

armasuisse Thun, Switzerland vincent.lenders@armasuiss

Learning Models to Detect Command and Control Attack Traffic

Towards Generalizing Machin

Lina Gehri ETH Zurich

Department of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology Zurich, Switzerland lina.gehri@gmail.com

Meeting Reality
T. Jančárková, D. Giovannelli, K. Podiņš, I. Winther
2023 © NATO CCDCOE Publications, Tallinn

Daniel Hulliger Cyber-Defence Campus

armasuisse Science and Technology Thun, Switzerland

daniel.hulliger@ar.admin.ch

Thun, Switzerland roland.meier@ar.admin.cl Vincent Lenders

Roland Meier

Cyber-Defence Campus

armasuisse Science and Tech

Cyber-Defence Campus armasuisse Science and Technology Thun, Switzerland vincent.lenders@ar.admin.ch

Abstract: Identifying compromised hosts from network traffic traces has become challenging because benign and malicious traffic is encrypted, and both use the same protocols and ports. Machine learning-based anomaly detection models have been proposed to address this challenge by classifying malicious traffic based on network flow features learned from historical patterns. Previous work has shown that such models successfully identify compromised hosts in the same network environment in which they were trained. However, cyber incidence response teams often have to look for intrusions in foreign networks, and we have found that learned models often fail to generalize to different network conditions. In this paper, we analyse the root cause of this problem using five network traces collected from different years and teams of Locked Shields, the world's largest live-fire cyber defence exercise. We then explore techniques to make machine learning models generalize better to unknown network

Keywords: machine learning, traffic classification, network security, command and control Locked Shields



DOCTORAL THESIS

Automating Defences against Cyber Operations in Computer Networks

Mauno Pihelaas

TALLINNA TEHNIKAÜLIKOOL TALLINN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY TALLINN 2021



Towards an Active, Autonomous and Intelligent Cyber Defense of Military Systems: the NATO AICA Reference Architecture

Paul Theron Salon de Provence, France

paul.theron@thalesgroup.com

Alexander Kott U.S. Army Research Laboratory Adelphi, MD, USA

Martin Drašar Masaryk University Brno, Czech Republic drasar@ics.muni.cz

Krzysztof Rzadca University of Warsaw Warsaw, Poland krzadca@mimuw.edu.pl

Benoît LeBlanc Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Cognitique Bordeaux France benoit.leblanc@ensc.fi

Abstract-Within the future complex massively interconnecte vehicles, sensors and effectors, and demanding extremely low failure r. operators cannot have an easy as enough reactions to cyber-attacks, and intelligent cyber defense. Mu Defense may provide an answer to presents the concept and arch Intelligent Cyber defense Agent (rationale of the AICA concept methodology and purpose that dri Reference Architecture (AICARA) and Technology Group, Thirdly, features and challenges of Multi defense Agent (MAICA). Fourtl assumed AICA Reference Architec our preliminary research issues, as we present the future lines of resea test the AICA / MAICA concept.

Keywords-intelligent agent, an security

RATIONALE FOR TH Today, five broad types of syster Air operations:

 Office and information i includes web services information managemen human resource manag This paper is based on NATO I: Intelligent, Autonomous and 7

978-1-5386-4559-8/18/\$31.00 C2018 IEEE

Mauno Pihelgas NATO CCDCOE Tallinn, Estonia

Luigi Mancini Sapienza University

Agostino Panico Sapienza University Rome, Italy

2021 13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict T. Jančárková, L. Lindström, G. Visky, P. Zotz (Eds.)

2021 © NATO CCDCOE Publications, Tallinn

Permission to make digital or hard copies of this publication for internal use within NATO and for personal or educational use when for non-profit or non-commercial purposes is granted providing that copies bear this notice and a full citation on the first page. Any other reproduction or transmission requires prior written permission by NATO CODCOE.

Towards an AI-powered Player in Cyber Defence Exercises

Roland Meier

Department of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering ETH Zürich Zürich, Switzerland meierrol@ethz.ch

Kimmo Heinäaro

NATO CCDCOE Tallinn, Estonia

kimmo.heinaaro@mil.fi

Vincent Lenders


Science and Technology armasuisse Thun, Switzerland vincent.lenders@armasuisse.ch

Artūrs Lavrenovs

NATO CCDCOE Tallinn, Estonia arturs.lavrenovs@ccdcoe.org


Luca Gambazzi

Science and Technology armasuisse Thun, Switzerland luca.gambazzi@armasuisse.ch







Sensors (examples)




























Level 0: Reactive narrow Al






Level 1: Limited-memory narrow Al

"Machine learning" today

Level 0: Reactive narrow Al





Level 2: General Al


Mimics human intelligence

Level 1: Limited-memory narrow Al

"Machine learning" today

Level 0: Reactive narrow Al





Level 3: Super Al

Surpasses human intelligence

Level 2: General Al

Mimics human intelligence


Level 1: Limited-memory narrow Al

"Machine learning" today

Level 0: Reactive narrow Al



Only level 0 and level 1 exist today Levels 0 – 2 exist today



Level 3: Super Al

Surpasses human intelligence

Level 2: General AI

Mimics human intelligence

Level 1: Limited-memory narrow Al

"Machine learning" today

Level 0: Reactive narrow Al



Five tasks for Al

Identification / classification What is it?

Categorisation What belongs together?

Assessment What is important?

Recommendation What should be done?

Prediction What will happen?



Locked Shields 2023 and 2024: Data collection during the partners run

- We participated as a blue team during the partners run
- Blue team was passive
- Goal: Collect data for future developments
- Result: Paper with public dataset



LSPR23: A Novel IDS Dataset from the Largest Live-Fire Cybersecurity Exercise

Allard Dijk^a, Emre Halisdemir^b, Cosimo Melella^c, Alari Schu^d, Mauno Pihelgas^d, Roland Meier^e

^aNetherlands Defence Academy (NLDA), Den Helder, The Netherlands

^bGazi University, Ankara, Türkiye

^cUniversity of Genoa (UniGe), Genoa, Italy

^dCooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), Tallinn, Estonia

^cArmasuisse Science and Technology, Thun, Switzerland

Abstract

Cybersecurity thre tly evolving, becoming increasingly sophisticated, automat telligent. This makes it difficult for organizations Industry professionals are lookffectiveness of cybersecurity ing for solution operations, rity, the importance of developing new dress these threats has emerged. Most nine learning. But these systems need teristics of malicious traffic. Such datas efore rarely available.

This paper advances the state of the whigh-quality IDS dataset. The dataset originates from Lowne of the world's most extensive live-fire cyber defense exercises. The trees that (i) it contains realistic behavior of attackers and defenders; (ii) it contains sophisticated attacks; and (iii) it contains labels because the attacker's actions are documented.

The dataset includes approximately 16 million network flows, of which approximately 1.6 million were labeled as attacks. What is unique about this dataset is the use of a new labeling technique that increases the accurady level of data labeling.

We evaluate the robustness of our dataset using both quantitative and qualitative methodologies. We begin with a quantitative examination of the Surjects IDS elects based on signatures and anomalies. Subsequently,

And after the Locked Shields 2024?





- Automated detection and response to some types of attacks (Cobalt Strike)
- Evaluation in a simulated environment during the next 12 months
- Evaluation in LS 2025 with other Blue Teams



Towards a fully automated Blue Team at Locked Shields

Thanks for your attention!

Dr. Roland Meier

armasuisse

roland.meier@ar.admin.ch



