# (Self) Driving Under the Influence: Intoxicating Adversarial Network Inputs


Roland Meier[1], Thomas Holterbach[1], Stephan Keck[1], Matthias Stähli[1], Vincent Lenders[2], Ankit Singla[1], Laurent Vanbever[1]

ACM HotNets 2019

(1) ETH zürich

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Confédération suisse
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# In-band-signaling in the telephony system allowed “hackers” free long-distance calls

[Wikimedia]

# What does in-band-signaling enable in networks?

**Why (and How) Networks Should Run Themselves**

Nick Feamster and Jennifer Rexford

**A Knowledge Plane for the Internet**

David D. Clark*, Craig Partridge♦, J. Christopher Ramming† and John T. Wroclawski*

**Unleashing the Potential of Data-Driven Networking**

Junchen Jiang†, Vyas Sekar†, Ion Stoica⋆+°, Hui Zhang†+

**A Novel Framework of Data-Driven Networking**

HAIPENG YAO[1], CHAO QIU[2], CHAO FANG[3], XU CHEN[1], AND F. RICHARD YU[4]

Experience-driven Networking: A Deep Reinforcement Learning based Approach

Zhiyuan Xu, Jian Tang, Jingsong Meng, Weiyi Zhang, Yanzhi Wang, Chi Harold Liu and Dejun Yang

[Dumont Telephone]

# Traditional networks separate data and control channels



# Self-driving networks merge data and control channels



*Attacking*
self-driving networks

*Defending*
self-driving networks

*Attacking*
self-driving networks

*Defending*
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# We distinguish between three privilege levels of an attacker



**Operator**

Controls the entire network

**Man in the middle**

Controls traffic on link(s)

**Host**

Controls host(s)

# We distinguish between two attack targets



Network infrastructure

E.g., forwarding behavior

Endpoints

E.g., applications

# We distinguish between two attack targets



Network infrastructure

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# Advances in network programability allow to perform many decisions in the data plane

**P4: Programming Protocol-Independent Packet Processors**

Pat Bosshart[†], Dan Daly[*], Glen Gibb[†], Martin Izzard[†], Nick McKeown[‡], Jennifer Rexford[**], Cole Schlesinger[**], Dan Talayco[†], Amin Vahdat[¶], George Varghese[§], David Walker[**]
[†]Barefoot Networks [*]Intel [‡]Stanford University [**]Princeton University [¶]Google [§]Microsoft Research

**Blink: Fast Connectivity Recovery Entirely in the Data Plane**

Thomas Holterbach,* Edgar Costa Molero,* Maria Apostolaki*
Alberto Dainotti,† Stefano Vissicchio,‡ Laurent Vanbever*

*ETH Zurich, †CAIDA / UC San Diego, ‡University College London

**Hardware-Accelerated Network Control Planes**

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**In-network Neural Networks**

Giuseppe Siracusano, Roberto Bifulco
NEC Laboratories Europe

**Contra: A Programmable System for Performance-aware Routing**

Kuo-Feng Hsu[†], Ryan Beckett[⋆], Ang Chen[†], Jennifer Rexford[‡], Praveen Tammana[‡], David Walker[‡]
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# Algorithms and their state determine the behavior of networks



# Adversarial inputs to data-driven networks can have big consequences

- Privacy violations
  e.g., traffic hijacking
- Performance degradation
  e.g., choosing longer paths
- Reachability problems
  e.g., disconnected network
- Revenue loss
  e.g., bad QoE for clients

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# Blink monitors TCP retransmissions to detect failed paths



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

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

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

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

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

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

Network infrastructure

E.g., forwarding behavior

Endpoints

E.g., applications

# Many host-based protocols and applications rely on feedback from the network

**Pytheas: Enabling Data-Driven Quality of Experience Optimization Using Group-Based Exploration-Exploitation**

*Junchen Jiang*[†], *Shijie Sun*[°], *Vyas Sekar*[†], *Hui Zhang*[†⋆]
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**PCC: Re-architecting Congestion Control for Consistent High Performance**

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**NetHide: Secure and Practical Network Topology Obfuscation**

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* *ETH Zürich* [◇]*armasuisse*

# Protocols and applications depend on different types of inputs

| | Host | MitM | Operator |
|---|---|---|---|
| ▪ Headers<br>e.g., sequence numbers |  |  |  |
| ▪ Metadata<br>e.g., timing |  |  |  |
| ▪ Payload<br>e.g., QoE |  |  |  |

# Adversarial inputs to endpoints and applications can have big consequences

- Security and privacy issues
  e.g., modified addresses
- Loss of situational awareness
  e.g., manipulated measurements
- Performance degradation
  e.g., faked congestion
- Broken debugging tools
  e.g., manipulated ICMP messages

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# Pytheas performs QoE optimization through a real-time exploration and exploitation process



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

# An adversary can report wrong data to Pytheas



# Adversarial inputs from some clients in a group can lower QoE for the other clients in the same group



*Attacking*
self-driving networks

*Defending*
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Let this car be our self-driving ~~car~~ network



How can we protect it?



# Countermeasures can be applied at different points



- ★ Program testing
- ★ Program obfuscation
- ★ Input verification
- ★ State modeling
- ★ Behavior monitoring

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

- Program testing
- Program obfuscation
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# Ensuring input quality makes it harder to feed adversarial inputs

Possible approaches



- Cryptography
  encryption or authentication
- Diversity
  use multiple, independent signals
- Verification
  verify legitimacy of signals

*Research question:*

Where is the sweet spot for maximizing input quality given the cost of modifying existing protocols, modifying applications, and impact on decision time?

# Invoking supervisor checks allows checks without degrading performance




- Supervisor runs “offline”
  more flexibility
- Driver gets some freedom
  to choose next state
- Driver is limited
  to plausible next states

*Research question:*

How does an efficient driver-supervisor interface look like, and how do we trade off fast, asynchronous operation against delays in enforcing safety?

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



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# ETH Zürich is hiring at all levels

Contact Laurent Vanbever (lvanbever@ethz.ch)

Professor/Assistant Professor (Tenure Track) of Cyber-Physical and Embedded Systems

+ PhD & post-doc positions in networking

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



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